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Abstract 
 
Martha Albertson Fineman frames philosophies of justice, freedom, equality, and human 
nature alongside original insights about the role of vulnerability and institutions in people’s lives 
to argue for increased government intervention. The conglomeration of these ideas form 
vulnerability theory, an emerging legal theory providing a loose framework for evaluating and 
creating public policy. The following article can be broken down into two parts. The first part 
defines vulnerability theory by identifying, evaluating, and discussing the interaction among the 
five major components of vulnerability theory: the rejection of the liberal subject in favor of a 
vulnerable subject, the universality and constancy of vulnerability, the role institutions play in 
mitigating vulnerability, the movement from formal equality to substantive equality, and the call 
for increased government intervention. The second part evaluates Nina Kohn’s criticism of 
vulnerability theory to help determine three important insights, or features, of the theory. First, 
with some slight adjusting, it helps establish a new, more desirable “post-identity approach” as a 
goal for public policy; second, it provides a compelling narrative for expanding the role of 
government; and third, it directs policymakers’ attention toward a potentially promising new 
method for achieving a more substantive equality. 
 
Keywords: Vulnerability Theory, Vulnerability, Public Policy, Law   
I. Introduction 
On December 22, 2017, President Donald Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. 
Speaker of the House Paul Ryan praised the act: “Today is about how much better things can be: 
More jobs, fairer taxes, and bigger paychecks.”1 President Trump joined in on the excitement: “. . 
.[I]t set off a tidal wave of good news that continues to grow every single day. Before the ink was 
dry, companies were announcing thousands and thousands of new jobs and enormous investments 
to their worker.”2 Others, such as Senator Elizabeth Warren, saw the passage of the bill in a 
different light: “I’m telling you, today, given the evidence, given what this tax bill looks like, that 
is an insult to working families across America.”3 The difference in opinion is caused by 
fundamentally different conceptions of justice, freedom, equality, and human nature. These 
abstract philosophical foundations have immediate, large-scale implications for society because 
these views are applied in the creation and passing of impactful laws. The abstract becomes 
tangible. The ideas become reality. 
 In the spirit of making an impact through ideas, Martha Albertson Fineman has created an 
abstract approach to law and public policy called “vulnerability theory.”4 This emerging legal 
theory draws from philosophies of justice, equality, and human nature to argue for a larger, more 
active government. Vulnerability theory has value as an overarching framework for creating and 
evaluating public policy. In the following paper, I will argue vulnerability theory helps establish a 
                                                          
1 Speaker Paul Ryan, Press Release, Speaker Ryan’s Floor Remarks on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (2017), available at 
https://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-ryans-floor-remarks-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act.  
2 President Donald Trump, Speech in Blue Ash, Ohio, Remarks by President Trump on Tax Reform (2018), available 
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-tax-reform-3/.  
3 Judy Woodruff interviewing Elizabeth Warren, Sen. Elizabeth Warren: GOP tax plan is giveaway to giant 
corporations, not middle class, PBS News Hour (2017) 
Transcripts from an interview on PBS News Hour with Judy Woodruff 
4 Martha Albertson Fineman is the Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law at Emory Law School. She founded and 
directs both the Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative and the Feminism and Legal Theory Project. 
new, more desirable “post-identity approach” as a goal for public policy; provides a compelling 
narrative for expanding the role of government; and directs policymakers’ attention toward 
institutions, a potentially promising new method for achieving a more substantive equality. 
 To accomplish this task, I will divide the paper into two primary sections: 
1. Give a comprehensive overview of vulnerability theory, emphasizing its weaknesses and 
strengths in the discussion. The definition will be structured into five components and will 
establish vulnerability theory as a compelling narrative and illustrate its promising 
institutional focus. 
2. Use Nina Kohn’s critique of vulnerability theory to discuss the theory’s limitations in terms 
of its lack of specificity, violations of autonomy, and inconsistency in its applicability. 
Through this discussion, the value and limitations of the post-identity approach will be 
outlined. 
II. Vulnerability Theory – Explained 
Vulnerability theory is an emerging legal theory that argues for a larger, more active state. 
Fineman paints a picture of humans as universally and constantly vulnerable, heavily impacted by 
societal institutions giving (or not) them the resources allowing them to fend for themselves.5 From 
this insight, the theory argues the government should change the unit of analysis used in 
policymaking from a traditional liberal subject to a deeply dependent vulnerable subject, and the 
government should strive to achieve a more substantive equality through a more responsive state.6  
                                                          
5 See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, Fineman on Vulnerability and Law, New Legal Realism Conversations 
(2015), available at: https://newlegalrealism.wordpress.com/2015/11/30/fineman-on-vulnerability-and-law/. 
[hereinafter Fineman, On Vulnerability and Law] This blog post is the best way to gain a loose grasp of vulnerability 
theory. The post, however, is far from all-encompassing.  
6 Id. 
To gain an understanding of the power and practicality of vulnerability theory – or lack 
thereof – is no small feat. To help the readers gain a comprehensive understanding of the subject, 
the explanation of vulnerability theory has been divided into five components. The first four 
components are central claims of vulnerability theory: the rejection of the liberal subject in favor 
of a vulnerable subject, the universality and constancy of vulnerability, the role institutions can 
play in mitigating vulnerability, and a movement from formal equality to substantive equality. The 
final component outlines the logical conclusion of these four claims – that the state should play a 
larger and more active role in our lives.  
 These components sometimes build off one another and support one another. Do not, 
therefore, see these claims in silos or in some logical order (except the final component), but rather 
consider how they interact in ways to collectively argue for a more responsive state. The 
interactions among the five components will be indicated as they occur in the following five 
sections. 
A. Rejection of the Liberal Subject 
Vulnerability theory rejects the more traditional and common liberal subject in favor of a 
vulnerable subject. Liberalism, the guiding philosophy behind the liberal subject, has a long, rich 
history in the United States.7 The impression John Locke left on the Founding Fathers has lasted 
two and a half centuries.8 So many of the social and political philosophers praised today – John 
Locke, Adam Smith, Jean-Jacque Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Robert Nozick, 
                                                          
7 See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (1955). In this classic political science book, Louis Hartz, a 1956 
American Political Science Association’s Woodrow Wilson Prize winner, explores the role liberalism has played in 
the history of the United States. Hartz argues that a primary reason communism and fascism did not take root in 
America is the pervasiveness of John Locke’s liberal philosophy in American politics. Hartz sees the history of 
American politics as remarkably narrow, with the primary political parties well within the Lockean liberal tradition. 
8 Id. 
John Rawls – are entrenched in the liberal tradition. This liberalism, importantly, is different from 
the Liberalism used in American politics today. On the American political spectrum, Liberalism 
is associated with the Democratic Party and pitted against Conservatism and the Republican Party. 
Despite the clear differences in platforms, both Liberalism and Conservatism derive much of their 
conclusions from the baseline political philosophy of liberalism and remain almost entirely 
consistent with liberalism.9 Vulnerability theory does not address the Liberalism associated with 
the American political spectrum; instead, vulnerability theory is concerned with the liberal subject, 
or a particular set of assumptions placed on the individual that flow from the broader political 
philosophy of liberalism. 
Liberalism comes in many different forms. Egalitarian Liberalism and Libertarian 
Liberalism hold the same starting assumptions identified in the following definition of liberalism 
but arrive at distinctly different conclusions.10 Liberalism, as it will be used in this paper, will refer 
in the broadest sense to encompass both ideologies. Borrowing from Michael Sandel and Martha 
Nussbaum, liberalism, at its core, is the claim that our society consists of a group of distinctly 
separate individuals, each individual deriving equal worth from his/her power to make choices in 
                                                          
9 Id. Liberals and Conservatives on the American political spectrum tend to place tremendous value in individual 
choice. The value of individual choice in American politics can perhaps best be displayed in the two parties’ stance 
regarding health care. Conservatives hated the Liberal-supported Affordable Care Act (ACA) in part because of the 
individual mandate, a component of the law that coerced individuals into buying some type of healthcare coverage 
or face a fine. But the ACA retained about as much choice as possible when compared to some of the alternative 
systems of healthcare found in Europe. See generally Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, Nudge: Improving 
Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness, (2008). Sunstein and Thaler work hard to find creative ways to 
implement societally beneficial policies that maintain people’s beloved choice. If liberalism were less dominant in 
American politics, their argument would be far less important. 
10 See Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, 11 (1996) [hereinafter, Sandel, Democracy] 
his/her attempt to achieve his/her goals in life.11 The law, it follows, should treat people 
accordingly.12 
Vulnerability theory does not, however, launch its attack against the liberalism defined by 
Sandel and Nussbaum.13 While some central claims of vulnerability theory closely echo classic 
critiques of liberalism – such as the feminist critique14 or the “sociological objection”15 – 
                                                          
11 See Martha Nussbaum, The Feminist Critique of Liberalism, The Lindley Lecture (1997) at 4. [hereinafter 
Nussbaum, Feminist Critique] Nussbaum suggests that for individuals, “the power of moral choice within them” is 
what gives them equal worth. To Nussbaum, this seemingly uncontroversial claim is the core of liberalism. See also 
Sandel, Democracy, supra note 10 at 3-13. See also Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 1 (1982). 
Sandel dedicates many pages breaking down liberalism in different ways, but the core of the idea remains the 
same and is echoed in the definition above. 
12 But what kind of law flows from these starting assumptions? Exactly. See Sandel, Democracy, supra note 10 at 
11. Egalitarian liberals use liberalism to argue for increased government intervention, arguing that the government 
must give people a minimum level of support so that people can have the capacity to make genuine choices and 
the realistic means to pursue their own conception of the good life. Libertarian liberals, on the other hand, believe 
that there should be very limited government intervention because any kind of intervention strips away people’s 
ability to make choices and pursue their own ends. The starting assumption of liberalism, therefore, should not 
suggest a specific type of public policy. Liberalism can be used to advocate for pretty much anything. 
13 See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth (2004) [hereinafter Fineman, Autonomy Myth]. In 
this 300-page book, the word “liberalism” cannot be found (at least not in the index). While Fineman does address 
the likes of Rawls, Nozick, and Locke, she does so for only several pages. There is no attempt to break down 
liberalism; Fineman is simply trying to break down our natural notions of autonomy. Our belief in autonomy may 
be a result of liberalism, but that does not mean Fineman rejects liberalism. See also Martha Albertson Fineman, 
The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 19 (2008) [hereinafter 
Fineman, Vulnerable Subject]. Fineman acknowledges that some may be concerned that “attacks on the liberal 
subject destabilize liberalism itself.” However, she believes this concern is ultimately unfounded. 
14 See Nussbaum, Feminist Critique, supra note 11Error! Bookmark not defined., at 5-6. Nussbaum defends 
liberalism from three common critiques of feminism. The critiques are: 
Feminists have made three salient charges against this liberal tradition as a philosophy that might be used 
to promote women's goals. They have charged, first, that it is too "individualistic": that its focus on the 
dignity and worth of the individual slights and unfairly subordinates the value to be attached to 
community and to collective social entities such as families, groups, and classes. They have charged, 
second, that its ideal of equality is too abstract and formal, that it errs through lack of immersion in the 
concrete realities of power in different social situations. Finally, they have charged that liberalism errs 
through its focus on reason, unfairly slighting the role we should give to emotion and care in the moral 
and political life. 
Vulnerability theory’s critique of the liberal subject seems to fall squarely in the realm of the first and second 
feminist critique Nussbaum identified. Vulnerability theory ultimately argues, much like the first critique, for public 
policy based on social relationships instead of separate individuals – a view Nussbaum argues fails in that it “is 
unlikely that liberal ends will be effectively served by collectivist means.” Nussbaum goes on to accept many of the 
feminist critiques, but she argues that these critiques can be accommodated for within liberalism (i.e. liberalism 
can learn from the critiques). Fineman’s critique should be seen in the same way Nussbaum sees the feminist 
critiques. 
15 See Sandel, Democracy, supra note 10, at 11-13. The sociological objection, as described by Sandel, argues that a 
truly independent self cannot exist because we are so heavily influenced by our surroundings from birth. There is 
vulnerability theory focuses exclusively on one common conclusion or assumption that stems from 
liberalism – American individualism.16 Individualism is the belief that individuals are distinctly 
separate, autonomous components of society who are capable and ultimately responsible, through 
rational choice, of determining and controlling the direction of their lives.17 Liberalism, as defined 
in the prior paragraph, is different than American individualism because liberalism, while 
emphasizing the importance of individuals and their power of choice, does not assume individual 
choices determine the course of people’s lives. The liberal subject, then, is not the subject 
perceived by all conceptions of liberalism, but rather a subject perceived by the conceptions of 
liberalism that support the assumptions of American individualism.  
The alternative to this individualistic conception of human nature, the vulnerable subject, 
is driven by two primary insights: the presence of universal and constant vulnerability and the 
large role institutions play in our lives.18 The vulnerable subject does not have the power to dictate 
                                                          
no “self” that can be found because we are unable to fully shake the imprint of our conditioning. People are social 
by their very nature. It does not make sense to conceive of an independent, agency-filled subject once it is 
acknowledged that these subjects are not independent. While the sociological objection uses the term 
“conditioning” to describe the external forces that eliminate selfhood, vulnerability theory uses the term 
“institutions” to describe these external forces. In both critiques, the idea that individuals are independent is 
questioned by claiming individuals are products of their surroundings. Vulnerability theory, however, differs in that 
it does not suggest the impact institutions play on people’s lives eliminates the possibility of an independent self. 
The third component in the definition of vulnerability theory, Section II-C: The Role of Institutions in Our Lives. 
further discusses the idea of independent selves who are still shaped by institutions. 
16 See Fineman, Autonomy Myth, supra note 13, at 9. Autonomy, while in some ways is seen interchangeably with 
individualism, is defined here as a lack of dependence. This lack of dependence implies individuals are not 
impacted significantly by outside forces, and therefore individuals are responsible for the outcome of their lives. 
Fineman suggests that this human nature assumption results in policies and laws (e.g. Bill of Rights) based on 
negative liberty (i.e. “freedom from”). See also Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13 at 26. Fineman suggests 
the liberal subject is a combination of autonomy, personal responsibility, and self-sufficiency. These ideas, 
collectively, are synonymous with individualism as defined above. 
17 Id.; See also M Neil Browne and Mary Allison Smith, Mobbing in the Workplace: The Latest Illustration of 
Pervasive Individualism in American Law, 12 Em. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 131 (2008). Browne and Smith stress the 
importance of self-reliance to the idea of individualism. They argue that Canadian individualism and American 
individualism both place a heavy emphasis on becoming “self-reliant;” the key difference being that American 
individualism, unlike Canadian individualism, actually believes that most people are genuinely self-reliant. 
18 See Fineman, On Vulnerability and Law, supra note 5. 
the course of his/her life through independent choices. The course of people’s lives is determined 
by the assets, capacities, or resilience gained through a complex set of interactions with societal 
institutions.19 To borrow from Elizabeth Anderson, people do not have access to functioning by 
simply being born; autonomy is achieved once people have access to a desirable level of 
functioning.20 In other words, the set of assumptions attached to the liberal subject are in certain 
ways realistic, but they are achieved only through the support of institutions. The following two 
sections – the Universality and Constancy of Vulnerability and The Role of Institutions in Our 
Lives – will further illustrate vulnerability theory’s new legal subject, the vulnerable subject. 
B. Universality and Constancy of Vulnerability 
Different academic fields see the nature of vulnerability in different ways. The literature 
about the environment uses the concept of vulnerability to determine which aspects of an 
environmental system are susceptible to harm and how much harm is likely to be incurred.21 A 
vulnerability framework has emerged in the information technology (IT) field to identify 
weaknesses in security systems.22 Consumer vulnerability is used to identify transactions or 
markets in which consumers are particularly harmed by asymmetric information.23 These three 
fields use the concept of vulnerability to identify areas, systems, or groups of people that are 
                                                          
19 Id. 
20 Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287-337 (1999), at 318. 
21 See Ira Feldman and Joshua Kahan, Preparing for the Day After Tomorrow: Frameworks for Climate Change 
Adaptation, Sustainable Development Law and Policy (2007); see also B.L. Turner II, et. al., A framework for 
vulnerability analysis in sustainability science, PNAS (2003); see also W Neil Adger, Vulnerability, Global 
Environmental Change (2006). 
22 See Robert Boyce, Vulnerability Assessments: The Pro-active Steps to Secure Your Organization, SANS institute, 
(2001); see also Vulnerability Assessment, Techopedia; see also Xiuzhen Chen et. al, An OVAL-based active 
vulnerability assessment system for enterprise computer networks, Inf Syst Front (2008). 
23 See Ryan Patrone, Linking Past and Present: Assessing the Stability of Post-Title VII Derivative Markets, NYU 
Journal of Law & Business (2016); see also Lisbet Berg, Consumer Vulnerability: Are Older People more Vulnerable 
as Consumers than Others?, International Journal of Consumer Studies (2015); see also Kuan-Pin Chiang and Anita 
Jackson, Consumer Vulnerability in the Context of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug, International Journal of 
Healthcare Management (2012). 
especially, or uniquely, vulnerable. Vulnerability theory, however, sees vulnerability more 
broadly: vulnerability is universal and constant. 
Fineman makes the claim that vulnerability is universal, “. . .[I]nherent in the human 
condition.”24 Unlike the conceptions of vulnerability in other fields, vulnerability is not reserved 
for special groups. Everyone is vulnerable. For example, consumers lack the information 
necessary, on their own, to prevent them from consuming a harmful product.25 Consumers cannot 
possibly know the names and functions of the ingredients in the food they buy, the chemical 
compounds in the medicine they take, and the meaning of the fine print in their mortgage. Some 
people may be more equipped than others to understand the reality of these transactions, but even 
the experts are still vulnerable to a certain extent. Vulnerability is not only experienced universally, 
vulnerability is experienced constantly. People cannot escape vulnerability; they are vulnerable 
from birth until death because people are unavoidably embedded in a variety of dependencies.26 
Events beyond human control could harm all of us, and in some instances – such as a natural 
disaster, disease, or economic collapse – there is nothing we can do to completely eliminate our 
susceptibility to harm. 
The universality and constancy of vulnerability is important for two related reasons. First, 
establishing a shared vulnerability among everyone in a population is rhetorically and logically 
effective at arguing for a larger role for the state – the goal of vulnerability theory. In the words of 
Frank Rudy Cooper: “. . .[S]ince we cannot escape our inevitable dependency, we might as well 
band together to fight for a strong state.”27 The second reason the universality and constancy of 
                                                          
24 See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13, at 1.  
25 Id. at 24 
26 See Fineman, On Vulnerability and Law, supra note 5. 
27 See Frank Rudy Cooper, Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory, 93 N.C.L. Rev. 1339 (2015), at 
1371 [hereinafter, Cooper, Always Already Suspect]. Cooper, a Law Professor at Suffolk University, revises 
vulnerability is important is because the claim that all people are vulnerable and dependent upon 
relationships and institutions lies in contradiction to the individualistic conception of the liberal 
subject.28 Vulnerability theory aims to move away from the liberal subject toward the vulnerable 
subject, and the universality and constancy of vulnerability helps the theory get there. In other 
words, universal and constant vulnerability are essential characteristics of the vulnerable subject – 
the subject at the center of vulnerability theory. This latter point supports the former point because 
moving toward the vulnerable subject suggests government intervention is more necessary and 
reasonable. Of course, the mere acceptance of the universal and constant nature of vulnerability 
does not require government action, but the claim helps move us a bit closer to that conclusion. 
The conception of vulnerability that has been discussed thus far, however, is not complete. 
Even if vulnerability is universal, surely everyone does not experience vulnerability in the same 
way (or to the same extent). The investor who diversifies his/her portfolio surely is not equally 
vulnerable to the investor with all his/her money in the housing market. In the language of 
vulnerability theory, the person with the diversified portfolio is not less vulnerable, but rather more 
resilient.29 Resilience is synonymous with capacity. The person with the diversified portfolio is, 
by the language of vulnerability theory, equally vulnerable as the person with their money in the 
housing market. The person with the diversified portfolio, however, is more equipped, or has more 
capacity, to overcome the vulnerability. Is “more resilient” essentially the same as “less 
vulnerable?” Yes. But distinguishing between resilience and vulnerability helps vulnerability 
                                                          
vulnerability theory to avoid its potential to advocate for racial profiling. Through this revision, he more broadly 
evaluates vulnerability theory. In this specific case, he is advocating for the utility of recognizing the constancy of 
the vulnerability experienced by everyone. 
28 If we are universally and constantly vulnerable, our rational decisions are less likely to dictate the course of our 
lives. As established in the prior component, we know that Fineman and vulnerability theory reject individualism as 
an accurate depiction of people’s lives.  
29 See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13, at 14-15. Fineman is careful to distinguish between vulnerability 
and resilience so that she can establish vulnerability as a universal.  
theory stress the idea that vulnerability is inevitable and shared. In other words, no one is immune 
from vulnerability. And as stated earlier, establishing a shared, universal vulnerability helps 
Fineman argue that the government must do more to build resilience.  
Resilience, the capacity to overcome or resist vulnerability, is built and destroyed through 
societal institutions. The following component argues that institutions play an overwhelmingly 
important role in our lives, and it is these institutions to which we must turn to address the 
universality and constancy of vulnerability.  
C. The Role of Institutions in our Lives 
Most people in the developed world entered the world in a hospital. Our early years are 
spent with our family. Many of us soon joined a daycare, and ultimately, we all entered school. 
Following high school, many of us chose to move on to college. And those of us who chose not to 
go to college likely entered the workforce. After forty to fifty years working, we enter retirement 
– a world where pensions, social security, and nursing homes are commonplace. And throughout 
this entire journey, we act as consumers and citizens, buying the food, shelter, and material goods 
needed to live our lives and acting within the law to avoid imprisonment. 
The hospital of our birth is regulated by the state to ensure our safety during a dangerous 
time.30 Our family structure is secured, legitimized, and sometimes made easier by the state 
through variety of laws and regulations.31 Daycares must follow a whole host of laws to establish 
                                                          
30 See US Department of Health & Human Services, available at: https://www.hhs.gov/regulations/index.html for 
an expansive list of laws regulating hospitals. If you are looking for specifics, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPPA) of 1996 is one place to start. 
31 The family is legitimized by marriage and child custody laws. The family is regulated in custody battles and cases 
of child abuse and neglect. The institution of family is made easier because of child tax breaks and generous 
marital deductions. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law 
and Society, 387 Utah L. Rev. (1993). Fineman is concerned about family law becoming outdated, hurting women 
and their children. Her argument illustrates how even the institution of the family, traditionally seen as a private 
legitimacy.32 Schools, of course, are established, run, and regulated by state governments. 
Universities are also established, run, and regulated by state governments.33 Our pay, working 
conditions, and place of work are regulated by many different state and federal laws.34 A set of 
laws regulate pensions,35 the federal government created and runs the Social Security System, and 
much like hospitals, nursing homes are subject to heavy regulation.36 As consumers throughout 
this life, we are protected, or left to fend for ourselves, by the state. As citizens, we must act within 
the confines of the law (established by the state) or face punishment from courts (established by 
the state) and be sent to prison (established by the state). 
 Our lives are inescapably and relentlessly intertwined with state institutions. While the 
specific example above is relatively confined to middle and upper-class experiences in the 
developed world, everyone is deeply dependent and intertwined with institutions of some kind.37 
                                                          
institution, is deeply impacted by laws and regulations. See also Daniella Cutas and Sarah Chan, Families – Beyond 
the Nuclear Ideal, Bloomsbury (2012), at 1. The argument aligns closely with Fineman’s argument, claiming that 
the law: “determines whose private life is more, or less, scrutinized; who can be a parent and what sorts of 
organization of private and family life are encouraged, tolerated or even allowed at all; which associations will be 
supported, both socially and materially; and so on.” See also Patricia Strach and Kathleen S. Sullivan, What the 
Institution of Family Tells Us about Governance, 64 Political Research Quarterly 94-106 (2011), at 95. Strach and 
Sullivan argue the family is a critical legal institution less private than traditionally conceived, claiming family plays 
an “important role in achieving public policy aims.” Collectively, these three sources help illustrate the importance 
of government in creating, perpetuating, and using family structure. These sources suggest the family may not rest 
exclusively in the private sphere. 
32 Licenses and regulation of child care are handled at the state level. In Pennsylvania, for example, a member of 
their Department of Human Services will inspect the facility at least once every twelve months. PA Code § 20.31 
(2008). 
33 If you are saying “but what about my private university?” you should consider how frequently the students at 
these universities are participants in various federal financial aid programs. The state may not have created all 
universities, but the state plays an important role in all universities’ existence. 
34 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has jurisdiction over everyone. Additionally, federal 
and state minimum wage laws are unavoidable. Plus, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) gave workers 
collective bargaining rights. 
35 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) helps vulnerable employees avoid exploitation 
through a misuse of their retirement funds. 
36 The Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA) of 1987 was passed to help curtail abuse. 
37 State created, enforced, and/or legitimized institutions such as family, education and economic structure, 
however locally organized, are unavoidable. In this sense, one cannot go through life without interacting with a 
substantial number of institutions that are somehow connected to the government. 
These institutions give people the capacity to overcome vulnerability.38 Rereading the last two 
paragraphs, one should begin to question whether the rational, liberal subject should be the starting 
assumption in the creation of laws given how prevalent external institutions are in our lives. 
Agency becomes less realistic after accepting how frequently people are impacted by external 
forces. And even those people who achieve agency seem to have accomplished the feat through 
societal institutions. We, people, are deeply vulnerable, reliant upon institutions for our survival. 
These state-enforced institutions give us the capacity to make decisions, find happiness, flourish, 
and live meaningful lives. 
Perhaps the most critical point of vulnerability theory is that institutions are responsible for 
building resilience. While we are all vulnerable, our differences lie in our changing, unequal levels 
of resilience.39 This institutional role in building resilience is not a claim unique to vulnerability 
theory. Fineman makes this claim with the help of Peadar Kirby and his work with resilience.40 
Kirby identifies three qualities of resilience, or assets, that institutions build in people: physical, 
human, and social.41 Kirby’s work helps illustrate just how impactful institutions are in people’s 
lives. Schools, healthcare, and family all build different types of resilience in different ways. In 
vulnerability theory, the line between public and private institutions is heavily blurred (notice the 
use of “family” as an institution).42 People are heavily intertwined and dependent upon institutions, 
and it is through these institutions that people gain autonomy. 
Taking one small step further, we begin to see the role the state plays in producing 
inequality. The state creates inequality because the state is responsible for dispersing the assets 
                                                          
38 See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13, at 13. 
39 Id. 
40 See Peadar Kirby, Vulnerability and Violence (2006). 
41 See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13 at 13-14 in reference to Id. 
42 For a discussion about the public nature of the institution of the family see supra note 31. 
that leave some rich and resilient and some poor and unequipped to live a life of vulnerability. 
Moving away from the liberal subject – a perspective that suggests individual choices are the cause 
of inequality – and stepping into the vulnerable subject – a perspective that suggests the state is 
the cause of inequality – is remarkably powerful. The state can and should address this unjust 
distribution of assets through the very institutions that are causing the injustices.43 Vulnerability 
theory justifies the call for increased government intervention through a rejection of the traditional 
liberal subject and a new conception of equality. 
 In response to the call for increased government intervention, libertarians could argue that 
the government should scale back substantially because the government is causing the inequality. 
While a full-fledged, detailed response to this libertarian objection is beyond the scope of this 
paper, the more immediate response of vulnerability theory is relatively clear. Scaling back the 
government substantially is undesirable because the conception of liberty that society should shoot 
for requires assets and capabilities that must be built through institutions. The liberal subject is a 
myth, and genuine autonomy cannot be achieved on a semi-equal scale in a world without an active 
government.44 The libertarian objection, therefore, seems to fall short. 
 From the vulnerability theory perspective, institutions are the source of inequality and the 
solution to reducing inequality is through more – not less – government. This perspective, 
however, seems a bit incomplete, as readers are still left wondering exactly how far institutions 
should go to correct injustices. Vulnerability theory responds to this concern by arguing the 
government must ensure a more just distribution of assets through its institutions. The fourth 
component of vulnerability theory, the movement from a formal to a more substantive equality, 
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helps us determine what just institutions look like by establishing a goal, albeit a still somewhat 
ambiguous one, for public policy. 
D. Substantive vs. Formal Equality 
Liberalism made the radical claim that all humans are of equal worth.45 The Founding 
Fathers embraced the claim, using the Declaration of Independence to express one of the 
sentiments of liberalism: “All men are created equal.” The Bill of Rights echoed many of these 
sentiments as well, advocating for equal treatment of speech and religion. And while the actions 
of American leaders proved to be deeply hypocritical to these legendary documents for at least 
two centuries, the America of today has finally begun, at least to some extent, to formally accept 
liberalism’s radical claim. The formal acceptance of this version of equality, however, does not go 
far enough. From a vulnerability theory perspective, equal treatment is profoundly different from 
equal opportunity. 
To gain a better understanding of the sense of equality that vulnerability theory embraces, 
we must first understand the sense of equality vulnerability theory is rejecting. Vulnerability theory 
is rejecting the formal, equal treatment style of equality popular in America and our Founding 
Father’s version of liberalism.46 Formal equality is the application of laws to all persons equally, 
leaving each individual free to fully exercise their rights. 47 This sense of equality embraces a 
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negative conception of liberty and rests on the assumption of American individualism.48 From a 
negative liberty perspective, genuine liberty is achieved when there are no formal barriers or 
constraints on individuals.49 I have negative liberty when no person, government, or institution is 
preventing me from going to a hockey game. If someone locks me to a chair, the ice arena refuses 
to let me in, or the government prevents the game from happening, my negative liberty has been 
violated. From an American individualistic perspective, so long as people are formally treated 
equal, equal opportunity is achieved because everyone is given the same theoretical set of choices, 
and it is through these choices that people dictate the course of their lives. From these two starting 
assumptions, formal equality is both equal treatment and equal opportunity. Justice is being served 
when the government restrains from restricting individual liberty. As established in the first three 
components, however, vulnerability theory rejects the liberal subject in favor of a vulnerable 
subject.50 Vulnerability theory’s conception of equal opportunity, therefore, is much different from 
the more popular conception of equality found in the United States today. 
Vulnerability theory drives “. . .[T]oward a more substantive vision of equality.”51 A more 
substantive equality would go beyond the equal right to choose. Substantive equality embraces a 
positive conception of liberty and rests on the assumption that institutions, or external factors 
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48 See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13, at 2. 
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50 See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13. 
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beyond our control, are the driving force behind the course of people’s lives.52 From a positive 
liberty perspective, people are free when they have the genuine capacity to dictate the course of 
their lives.53 I have positive liberty if there are no external barriers preventing me from going to 
the hockey game, and I additionally must have the ability to get to the ice arena and the money to 
buy a ticket. Merely treating everyone the same is not a genuine freedom because some people are 
not capable of leading a meaningful life on their own, particularly if they have faced any sort of 
adversity.54 From an anti-individualistic (i.e. external factors have a large impact on the course of 
our lives) perspective, formal equality is not desirable because eliminating constraints and giving 
people choices does not address their vulnerability to institutions. A more substantive equality 
would take the insights of vulnerability theory, strive for a more positive liberty, and reject 
individualism to achieve a more genuine sense of equality.55 Fineman argues that the United States 
Constitution does not go far enough to be used as a model for equality.56 From the vulnerability 
theory perspective, the refusal to grant positive rights, such as the right to shelter, is indicative of 
an inadequate understanding of the role vulnerability and institutional dependency play in our 
lives.57 The United States cannot achieve equality by allowing the institutions they create to behave 
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unjustly while refusing to intervene in the name of negative liberty. Instead, the state should take 
responsibility for its institutions and ensure that people are being given a more genuine equal 
opportunity.  
One important way to see the difference between formal and substantive equality is to 
understand how clear the difference is between the perceptions of the value of “equal opportunity” 
from the two competing conceptions of equality and liberty. From the American individualistic 
and formal equality perspective, equal opportunity is synonymous with equal treatment. From a 
vulnerability theory perspective, however, equal opportunity must account for factors beyond an 
individual’s control and advocate for more positive rights.58 The vulnerability theory approach to 
equal opportunity would advocate for a more substantive equality, an equality that understands the 
role institutions play in our lives and gives people the more equal capacity to achieve their goals. 
E. A More Responsive State 
The goal of vulnerability theory, in the simplest terms possible, is to argue for a more 
responsive state. Resting on the values of fairness, a more genuine equal opportunity, and a positive 
conception of liberty, vulnerability theory puts forth a powerful argument in favor of increased 
government intervention. In summary, the four components (i.e. reasons) lead to a call for more 
government intervention (i.e. the conclusion) because: 
• Individuals do not have the agency that American individualism assumes. In turn 
we must reject this liberal subject in favor of a vulnerable subject. Borrowing from 
the insights in the following two components, we know this vulnerable subject is 
universally and constantly vulnerable and deeply embedded in, and reliant upon, 
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institutions. The vulnerable subjects need help, choices left weak by the crushing, 
all-powerful, complex institutional framework that shapes their lives. 
• Vulnerability is universal and constant. We live our lives in a state of never ending, 
unavoidable vulnerability. Fortunately, we share our vulnerability with everyone, 
and collectively, we (the state) have established a set of institutions to build our 
collective resilience to be more equipped to handle vulnerability. 
• The institutions in question – health care, criminal law, schools, family, and more 
– are all reinforced, given legitimacy, established, benefitted, regulated, and/or 
funded by the state. These institutions give us the resources (i.e. resilience) to live 
our lives in the face of unceasing vulnerability. The role of the state in these 
institutions suggests the state is responsible for their behavior; if institutions 
dispense assets unjustly, institutions have an obligation to correct this injustice. 
This last point is critical, as the causation of injustice goes from “individual choices 
and natural randomness” to “the state’s unjust distribution of resources.” 
• After reframing the subject by which we base our public policy, our conception of 
equality begins to change. The power of choice and autonomy weakened, equal 
treatment and formal equality are left less desirable. Moving forward, our policy 
should aim for a more substantive, equal opportunity-based sense of equality rooted 
in positive liberty and a rejection of American individualism. The goal of our 
institutions should not follow the sense of equality established in the US 
Constitution but should borrow from more positive rights found in constitutions 
abroad.  
 “Okay, I agree. The state should do more to help its vulnerable subjects and strive for a 
more substantive version of equality. But how exactly should the state intervene? And to what 
extent?” Vulnerability theory provides loose guidelines to answer these questions. The power in 
the theory probably lies more in the argument for why the state should intervene as it does in the 
argument for how the state should intervene. 
To go beyond equal protection, vulnerability theory suggests that policy address the 
institutions that dispense different levels of assets or resilience.59 To achieve equality, the 
government must change the institutions that create inequality.60 For example, the institution of 
the family was dispersing assets to traditional heterosexual couples while withholding assets to 
same-sex couples. Vulnerability theory would advocate for a change in law to correct this 
injustice.61 Vulnerability theory sees all institutions, including the family, as being connected to 
the government in certain ways.62 From this commonality among the institutions, Fineman argues 
that some institutions can correct the injustices of others.63 Institutions are this collective, critically 
important body that must be closely and actively monitored to achieve equality. For example, the 
substantial inequality produced through the institution of the family can be reduced through a 
strong education system. Or the inequality women traditionally experience within the family can 
be partially offset through stronger maternity leave policies or the addition of paternity leave into 
the institution of capitalism. Institutions – government-backed and asset-conferring – become the 
focus and mechanism by which policymakers should see and rectify inequality in society. 
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The focus on institutions to combat inequality lies in contrast to the more common focus 
on individual identities. Vulnerability theory is a post-identity approach.64 Fineman argues that 
race-based, identity-focused policies are undesirable because there are always exceptions, such as 
successful people from traditionally disadvantaged groups and unsuccessful people from 
traditionally advantaged groups.65  She argues: “. . .[D]isadvantage is produced independent of 
racial and gender biases in many-but of course not all-instances.”66 In response, the focus should 
shift toward the ways in which institutions disperse assets to different groups and individuals. In 
this respect, Fineman is more interested in targeting important institutional relationships – 
parent/child, consumer/producer, financial adviser/client – to combat inequality.67 This focus will 
lead to a more effective way to reach a more substantive equality because these institutions are 
creating the inequality.  
At this point, readers may be left hungry for more. Vulnerability theory will be further 
expanded upon in the following section by using Nina Kohn’s critique of vulnerability theory as a 
guide to considering its common concerns and limitations. 
III. Why does Vulnerability Theory Matter? 
Thus far, vulnerability theory has been established as, at the very least, an interesting frame 
of reference, or perspective, for creating and evaluating public policy. In this sense, vulnerability 
theory has utility. Yet the specifics of the utility, or the takeaways, must still be identified.68 Some 
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of these takeaways will be pulled from the prior discussion of the five components, but others will 
be identified with the help of the major criticisms of vulnerability theory. The following section 
will identify the limitations and some of the valuable aspects of vulnerability theory by considering 
the effectiveness of several critiques. 
This section proceeds in two parts. The first part evaluates three criticisms of vulnerability 
theory: lack of specificity, violation of autonomy, and inconsistency in its application. The second 
part outlines the three important takeaways from vulnerability theory in terms of its ability to 
answer the simple but important question of why vulnerability theory matters. 
a. Is Vulnerability Theory Practical? An Evaluation of a Criticism 
Vulnerability theory has been applied in different levels of detail by various scholars, 
including Fineman herself, to argue for more regulation of employers,69 the legalization of same-
sex marriage,70 the legalization of polygamous marriages,71 and increased protection for the 
elderly.72 The multiple applications of vulnerability theory suggest it is practical and applicable, 
but the major criticisms of vulnerability theory disagree.  
Nina Kohn criticizes vulnerability theory by arguing that Fineman’s application of 
vulnerability theory shows vulnerability theory’s lack of specificity, violation of autonomy, and 
inevitable inconsistency.73 While Kohn’s critiques point out some valid flaws, her claim that 
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“Fineman's theory of vulnerability does not work as a prescriptive tool”74 does not hold. 
Vulnerability theory should not be thrown aside; instead, different aspects of vulnerability theory 
should be emphasized and used to help policymakers achieve better public policy. 
i. Specificity 
Nina Kohn uses Fineman’s application of vulnerability theory to old-age policy to argue 
that vulnerability theory has limited practical use. Specifically, she argues: “Vulnerability theory 
provides little guidance as to how to prioritize among vulnerable subjects when allocating limited 
financial resources and political capital.”75 Kohn attempts to bring vulnerability theory into the 
real world. Pointing out the inevitable problem of limited resources, Kohn rightly suggests that 
governments are unlikely to have the resources necessary to meet vulnerability theory’s goal of 
achieving full-fledged substantive equality, or genuine equal opportunity. Because of the limited 
resources, the government must prioritize certain issues. But vulnerability theory explicitly goes 
against targeting specific vulnerable groups, and it is primarily because of this lack of ability to 
prioritize, Kohn argues, that vulnerability fails in regard to its specificity. 
Proponents of vulnerability theory, however, would argue that the theory can prioritize in 
a different way. Because vulnerability theory stresses the importance of institutions, not 
populations, the theory would prioritize the institutions that confer assets in the most unjust manner 
instead of the populations who are most vulnerable. While this method of prioritization is not 
explicitly outlined in the theory, the institutional focus suggests this response is the direction 
vulnerability theory would turn. Vulnerability theory cannot prioritize the distribution of limited 
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resources among populations, but the theory can prioritize the distribution of resources by focusing 
on specific institutional relationships.  
The problem with this general response, however, is that the government cannot simply 
target the institutions that confer assets in the most unjust manner because some of these 
institutions lie outside of the government’s scope. The family, for example, may not be the 
untouchable private institution as it is sometimes asserted,76 but the government can only interfere 
so much. On its own, this general problem is not a big deal, as the government can respond by 
turning to other institutions to correct these injustices. Theoretically, a vulnerability theory lens 
would identify an unjust distribution of assets being conferred through one institution – such as 
social skills being conferred by the family – and then turn to other institutions to correct this 
injustice – such as the education system. But vulnerability theory does not answer which 
alternative institutions should correct the injustices. We must assume vulnerability theory would 
turn to the institutions thought to be most capable of correcting the injustice. 
But on further thought, the government should consider more than effectiveness in its 
consideration of public policy. An implementation of major policy should weigh the additional 
factors of how efficiently government resources are being used and the extent to which autonomy 
is being violated. For example, in the specific context of social skills being unjustly conferred by 
families, vulnerability theory does not provide the parameters to decide between an extremely 
effective but extremely expensive program and a somewhat effective but far less expensive 
program. Vulnerability theory is also unable to help determine whether an effective program that 
violates autonomy is more desirable than a slightly less effective program that preserves slightly 
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more autonomy. There are simply no criteria outlined in vulnerability theory to guide a decision 
among these important factors. 
This critique of specificity, however, is unfair. Kohn may have effectively pointed out a 
limitation in applying the theory, but all theories have limitations. What is perhaps the most highly 
praised theory of justice in the last century, the work of John Rawls, does not provide an adequate 
answer as to whether justice is best pursued through socialism or capitalism.77 Theories are simply 
not meant to answer every question. At a certain point, theories leave policymakers to their own 
devices, and vulnerability theory is no different. While it is important to understand the limitations 
of a theory, a theory should not be dismissed merely because it has limitations. And despite its 
limitations, vulnerability theory still provides a concrete framework that gives policymakers 
guidance to help them write and advocate for more just public policy. But the “more just” public 
policy is not “more just” from all perspectives. Nina Kohn, in her second major criticism of 
vulnerability theory, suggests the laws advocated for by vulnerability theory are undesirably 
paternalistic. 
ii. Violation of Autonomy 
Kohn argues Fineman’s application of vulnerability theory to old-age policy shows the 
theory’s tendency to be too paternalistic.78 This paternalism objection, however, deserves little 
attention because of vulnerability theory’s explicit rejection of the liberal subject. If the liberal 
subject is rejected, free choice becomes substantially less important because choice no longer 
carries so much weight in dictating people’s lives. Another reason the paternalistic objection does 
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not hold is because vulnerable subjects need paternalistic policies to build resilience and capacity. 
From the vulnerability theory perspective, paternalistic policies do not reduce autonomy by 
restricting choice, but rather enhance autonomy by building capacity. The disagreement between 
Kohn and Fineman is deep, resting on different conception of human nature and liberty. Further 
discussion of these different perspectives can be found in the first part of the paper. While Kohn’s 
critiques of specificity and autonomy do not gain much traction, her critique of inconsistency, with 
some help of a critique by Frank Rudy Cooper, bring to light the most important challenges to the 
applicability of vulnerability theory. 
iii. Inconsistency 
Vulnerability theory’s inconsistency is pointed out by Kohn in her evaluation of Fineman’s 
application of vulnerability theory to public policy for the elderly.79 Kohn illustrates how despite 
criticizing the idea of labeling special groups as vulnerable, Fineman identifies the elderly as 
vulnerable subjects.80 Fineman suggests that policies can and should use age as a threshold for 
reducing the vulnerability of older adults.81 Using vulnerability theory to advocate for policy 
targeting special groups of people goes directly against a central claim of vulnerability theory.82 
Specifically, vulnerability theory claims that laws should focus on institutions rather than 
vulnerable populations.83 Regarding formal equality and specially targeted groups, Fineman 
claims: 
In this regard, identity categories are both over- and under-inclusive. The groups that 
traditional equal protection analyses recognize include some individuals who are relatively 
privileged notwithstanding their membership in these identity groups. Indeed, while race 
or gender may complicate and compound disadvantage, individual successes abound 
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across these and other categories that the Equal Protection Clause demarcates. These 
individual successes create both theoretical and empirical pitfalls: Successful individuals 
who belong to a designated suspect class can undermine the coherence and dilute the 
strength of critical analyses based on asserted bias against the same identity group. At the 
same time, identity categories are too narrow. Poverty, denial of dignity, and deprivation 
of basic social goods are "lack-of-opportunity categories" that the current framework of 
identity groups does not recognize; such disadvantage transcends group boundaries.84 
Fineman’s critique of formal equality should apply to age-based policy as well, but her policy 
proposals, Kohn argues, do not echo this sentiment. If Fineman herself advocates for policy 
blatantly inconsistent with vulnerability theory, surely the inconsistency is somewhat inevitable. 
Or at the very least, vulnerability theory seems to contain inconsistencies when applied to certain 
kinds of issues.  
 Kohn’s critique of vulnerability theory’s inconsistency, however, is misleading. While it is 
true Fineman advocates for age-based policy, Fineman’s support for this age-based policy seems 
to be a compromise, directed narrowly to the Canadian Commission, the focus of the article, in 
response to what she considered to be too heavy of a focus on autonomy.85 Fineman is concerned 
older populations will not get protection; therefore, Fineman advocates for age-based policy 
because, for lack of better terms, it is better than nothing. Importantly, Fineman immediately 
follows her age-based proposal by acknowledging the proposal’s departure from vulnerability 
theory: 
Of course, a response sensitive to the vulnerability approach would suggest that these kinds 
of provisions to safeguard those vulnerable to exploitation be more broadly drawn to reflect 
the fact that many people in society find themselves in such a position with respect to 
financial matters.86  
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It is explicitly clear: the age-based policy Fineman advocates for is not representative of 
vulnerability theory. Fineman knows it is not representative of vulnerability theory and proposes 
an alternative way to shape the policy. A vulnerability theory approach, then, would advocate for 
a law that allows the cancellation of exploitative financial transactions for all people. The policies 
Fineman advocates for in the two small paragraphs Kohn targets can easily be applied more 
broadly. Kohn’s critique of vulnerability theory’s inconsistency, therefore, is not valid.87 
  Kohn’s critique of inconsistency may not be particularly useful or fair, but her criticism 
sheds light on an important issue. Fineman advocates for a post-identity approach, but she throws 
this approach out the window in her application of law to old-age policy. This behavior suggests 
that the post-identity approach may not be a practical solution to the problem of over and under-
inclusivity that always accompanies the identity-based approaches to policy.88 To recap, the post-
identity approach advocates for the elimination of “vulnerable populations” from the policy 
conversation. To gain more substantive equality, vulnerability theory argues, policy must go 
“beyond identities” and address the root of the problem at the institutional level. For example, 
universities often dedicate specific kinds of resources for first-generation college students. The 
post-identity approach would hesitate to support resources pegged to specific populations, such as 
first-generation college students. Instead, universities could make the resources available to 
students on a case by case basis depending on whether they were deprived of certain assets or some 
resilience growing up. This latter approach would more directly target the problem – that people 
attend college with disparity of social assets given to them by their families. 
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 There are two potential problems, however, to this post-identity approach. The first 
problem is the government (or university) does not have the time to evaluate every single person 
to determine exactly how institutions have built resilience in each one of them. Pegging specific 
populations to a program or policy serves a heuristic to help groups of people who need it. Yes, 
the use of this heuristic will not be perfect, and there will inevitably be some people left out and 
other people getting assets who don’t deserve it, but maybe the lack of perfection is worth it to 
save resources. It is often just not plausible to evaluate everyone. The second problem with the 
post-identity approach is that specific population might have genuinely unique experiences that 
call for their identity to be incorporated into the policies. Cooper makes this point, arguing that 
black people’s experience with police brutality is unique, and therefore it would be irresponsible 
to move “beyond identity.”89 The post-identity approach might ignore the reality of the social 
landscape, causing policy to become less effective at achieving substantive equality. These two 
problems – lack of practicality and the potential for identity to be fundamentally important to an 
issue – carry substantial weight. Moving forward, policymakers must consider these points when 
trying to use the post-identity approach. 
Fortunately, the post-identity approach can incorporate the criticisms and still be used in a 
practical manner. The criticisms can be incorporated into the theory with the asking of one simple 
question: “as policy moves away from targeting specific populations toward a post-identity 
approach, is the policy sacrificing government resources or ignoring experiences unique to specific 
populations?” After considering these points, policymakers can conduct a brief cost-benefit 
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analysis before making the decision. This method should prevent the post-identity approach from 
being used in a deeply undesirable way. 
b. How is Vulnerability Theory Valuable? 
The following three takeaways represent the most powerful, important, and useful aspects 
of vulnerability theory. These insights are important for their own unique reason, but they all stand 
up to criticism and contain some kind of practical benefit, as illuminated in the prior paper. While 
the benefits of vulnerability theory certainly cannot be confined to the following three takeaways, 
these three points represent the most essential insights found in the prior discussion: 
1. The post-identity approach serves as a valuable goal for public policy, but this approach 
should not be pursued in every context. Sometimes, targeting specific populations is the 
better route to equality, but ultimately, the post-identity approach should be the goal in 
achieving more substantive equality. 
2. The overall narrative vulnerability theory creates – that people are all vulnerable, and we 
create institutions to help build our resilience to combat our vulnerability – is a unique, 
rhetorically effective way to advocate for the government increasing its involvement to 
help society achieve a more substantive equality. 
3. The idea that institutions are the source of inequality is rhetorically and substantively 
effective. While it is well beyond the scope of this paper to consider whether the 
institutional focus more effectively achieves substantive equality, the new approach seems 
quite promising and should be explored. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Fineman rejects the liberal subject in favor of a vulnerable subject. People, she argues, are 
universally vulnerable, inextricably embedded in institutional relationships from birth until death. 
These institutions give people the capacity to achieve autonomy in a life of vulnerability, but 
unfortunately, the institutions do not always confer assets, capacities, or resilience equally. It 
follows that the government, through institutions, is the source of inequality. Therefore, the 
government must respond by more actively pursuing equality through its institutions. The equality 
pursued, however, must be a more substantive equality, a conception of equality found outside of 
the United States but rarely within. From these core components, policymakers can glean three 
major insights: a cautious post-identity approach, a new vulnerability narrative to guide their 
thoughts, and a new focus – institutions – for policy in the future.  
As Paul Ryan, Donald Trump, and Elizabeth Warren consider policy surrounding the next 
major issue in Congress, they have a new legal theory to guide their thoughts. While it is almost 
laughable to suggest policymakers would use a theory to guide policy in such a direct manner, it 
is realistic to think the ideas in this theory – particularly the move toward a post-identity approach, 
the narrative of universal vulnerability being overcome through institutions building resilience, 
and the focus on institutions for public policy – could have an indirect, long-term impact on the 
general conversation. Vulnerability theory can make an impact through public policy. 
